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Does Prison Reform Bring Sentencing Reform? The
Congress, the Courts, and the Structural Injunction
Brian K. Landsberg*
The structural suit is one in which a judge, confronting a state
bureaucracy over values of constitutional dimension, undertakes to
restructure the organization to eliminate a threat to those values posed
1
by the present institutional arrangements.
The structural injunction recognizes the bureaucratic nature of the
2
modern state.
A classic metaphor for a polycentric problem is a spider web, in which
the tension of the various strands is determined by the relationship
among all the parts of the web, so that if one pulls on a single strand, the
3
tension of the entire web is redistributed in a new and complex pattern.
This is a symposium on sentencing reform, but I was asked to write about
prison reform litigation. These seem like two independent areas of reform. Still,
one could argue that the two are inextricably intertwined, since prisons flow from
sentences of confinement and those sentences rely on the availability of a place
of confinement. So that is a connection that this Article explores. It is a
connection that Congress addressed in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PLRA) which, perhaps unwittingly, validated the structural injunctions in cases
attacking conditions of confinement as unconstitutional. And it is a connection
that lies not far beneath the surface of the California prison reform case, Brown v.
4
Plata. Both the statute and the decision in Plata are more than what appears on
5
the surface.
Prisoners in California’s state prison system brought suit to attack the grossly
inadequate mental and physical medical care provided to them during their
6
confinement. The suits did not attack California’s draconian sentencing laws; it

* Many thanks to Gerald Caplan for his valuable suggestions. Thanks, as well, to Robert Mayville and
Ryan Matthews for research and editing assistance.
1. Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1,
2 (1979) [hereinafter The Forms of Justice].
2. OWEN M. FISS & DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 528 (2d ed. 1984).
3. William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy,
91 YALE L.J. 635, 645 (1982), quoted in Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01–1351TEH, 2005 WL 2932253, at
*25 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
4. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1997); Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1910.
6. Plata, 131 S.Ct. at 1922 (2011).
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7

is doubtful that a constitutional attack on those laws would have succeeded. The
PLRA sought to impose strict limits on remedies in cases like Brown v. Plata
8
attacking prison conditions. However, despite these limitations, the Court in
Brown v. Plata issued an order requiring the reduction of the prison population in
9
10
California. Some may regard the result as a form of sentencing reform. This
result flows from the convergence of a structural injunction, a resistant state
government, and the constraints on federal court power: the Court could not
effectively order the construction of new prisons to remedy the overcrowding
that was arguably at the root of the unconstitutional medical conditions.
For this symposium on sentencing reform, this article uses the recent
11
Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Plata as a platform to consider the
relationship between traditional structural injunctions, Congressional legislation,
and prison sentences. In adopting the PLRA, Congress reacted to a perceived
excess of structural injunctions flowing from findings that conditions of
12
confinement in prisons violated constitutional norms. The PLRA creates
procedural and substantive requirements for entry of a “prisoner release order,”
but it largely replicates the law of structural injunctions and, contrary to the
13
dissents in Plata, places toothless limits on relief. The order under appeal in
Plata seems to fall within the PLRA’s definition of a prisoner release order, and
14
the Court held that it complied with the PLRA. Experience under Plata suggests
that the prison cases are at best a crude and indirect method of sentencing
15
reform. Sentencing reform should be based on careful legislative review of
sentencing laws, rather than on the need to provide a constitutional minimum of
medical and mental health care. Yet the judicial findings in the California cases
16
may lead to demand for sentencing reform, and the relief in those cases may
lead to changes in the length of time prisoners serve and may lead to their

7. Even in the area of the death penalty, the Supreme Court has only found certain instances of the death
penalty unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Constitution, based on
disproportionality of the punishment. E.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 815 (1988) (holding the
death penalty cruel and unusual as applied to a fifteen year old); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 787 (1982)
(holding the death penalty cruel and unusual as applied to someone satisfying the mens rea for robbery, but not
murder).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1997).
9. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1946.
10. Michael Vitiello, Alternatives to Incarceration: Why is California Lagging Behind?, 28 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1275, 1294–98 (2012).
11. 131 S. Ct. at 1910. The Supreme Court opinion reviews an order in two consolidated lower court
cases, Coleman v. Brown and Plata v. Brown. This article refers to both cases as Plata.
12. Alicia Bower, Comment, Unconstitutionally Crowded: Brown v. Plata and How the Supreme Court
Pushed Back to Keep Prison Reform Litigation Alive, 45 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 555, 565 (2012).
13. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1950–68 (Scalia, J. and Alito dissenting).
14. Id. at 1937.
15. See Steven Nauman, Note, Brown v. Plata: Renewing the Call to End Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing, 65 FLA. L. REV. 855, 880 (2013).
16. See id. at 879.
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diversion to jails rather than prisons—arguably a sort of sentencing reform. Thus,
while no court in a case challenging prison conditions has ordered the state to
“reform your sentencing laws or policies,” it may be worthwhile to examine the
relationship between prison reform and sentencing reform.
I. THE STATEWIDE STRUCTURAL INJUNCTION
The prison cases, much like the school desegregation cases that blazed a trail
17
for structural injunctions, have their genesis in the creation of a legal duty. For
example, the Supreme Court agreed in 1976 that prisoners had a right to adequate
18
health care, a ruling that undergirds the lower court findings of violations in the
19
Plata cases. Conditions of confinement in prisons in Alabama, Texas, and
20
Arkansas gave rise to the early structural injunctions against prison systems. In
Arkansas, the initial decrees were simple prohibitions on continuation of
unconstitutional practices, such as whipping prisoners, and imposing other
21
corporal punishment of prisoners without adequate safeguards. After five years
of litigation, the federal district court in Arkansas, faced with truly horrific
conditions, looked to the Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clauses of the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments to find a right to minimally
22
adequate conditions of confinement. At that point, the court eschewed looking
at each separate condition individually and adopted a totality of the
23
24
circumstances test. Nor did they examine separately each prisoner’s situation.
The test can be criticized as murky. The totality of circumstances test, applied to
25
the prison population as a whole, had a profound impact on the remedy.
Remedy tended to follow a familiar trajectory. Remedy flows from violation.
“As with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the
26
remedy.” The Court has never said that a structural violation could go without
remedy, although in one notable case its finding that there was no structural
violation seemed to flow from its conclusion that the courts were not competent

17. See Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court
Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 558–59 (2006).
18. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
19. See Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 677 (9th Cir. 2014)
20. Schlanger, supra note 17, at 569–70 n.71.
21. Talley v. Stephens, 247 F.Supp. 683, 689 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
22. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 364 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (Holt II). See also, Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F.
Supp. 804, 816 (E.D. Ark 1967); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580–81 (8th Cir. 1968); Courtney v. Bishop,
409 F.2d 1185, 1186 (8th Cir. 1969); and Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825, 826 (E.D. Ark. 1969) (Holt I) for
cases in Arkansas in the intervening years.
23. Holt II, 309 F.Supp. at 373.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 383–84.
26. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
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27

to impose a structural remedy. In the typical prison conditions case, once it
found a violation of the Constitution, the court would enter a prohibitory
injunction to stop cruel and unusual punishment or a mandatory injunction to fix
28
the conditions of confinement so they would no longer be unconstitutional.
These injunctions would fail, for a couple of reasons. First, they were directed at
29
large bureaucratic organizations with diffusion of responsibility. Second, the
bureaucrats relied on the legislature for their funding, and the legislature placed
30
prison funding low on their priority list. To make matters more difficult, the
prison officials also had to contend with their employees, the correctional
officers, whose actions contributed in a big way to the unconstitutional
conditions. In some cases a court may be tempted to engage in in terrorem tactics
to encourage compliance—threaten to release prisoners, take over the prison
31
32
system, or impose taxes. These tactics have not proven successful. More
successful are orders to keep records relating to conditions and to file periodic
33
reports to the court.
Once the prohibitory injunction fails to bring about reform, the court
recognizes that the problem is systemic and that the defendants not only need
34
more specific direction but there is a need to restructure the institution. At this
point, the court may well turn to a special master to evaluate reports to the court,
investigate conditions, evaluate plans which the defendants may propose, and
35
develop a court plan if the defendant’s plans prove inadequate. If these methods
do not work, the court may appoint a receiver to take control of the prison

27. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 7, 41 (1973).
28. Some courts were more aggressive, such as Judge Justice in the Texas case, Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.
Supp. 1265, 1391 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
29. See, e.g., id. at 1274 (concerning the practices of the Texas Department of Corrections, a state agency
“responsible for the confinement and management of adult convicted prisoners of the State of Texas”).
30. See, e.g., id. at 1290 (finding that the Texas legislature apportioned funding for prison staffing at a
level significantly below the national average, resulting in a high ratio of prisoners to prison staff).
31. See e.g. cases cited supra note 22 and accompanying text. See also Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304, 306
(8th Cir. 1971); Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194, 217 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (Holt III); Finney v. Ark. Bd. of Corr.,
505 F.2d 194, 207 (8th Cir. 1974); Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251, 254 (E.D. Ark. 1976); Finney v. Hutto,
548 F.2d 740, 742 (8th Cir. 1977); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 697 (1978); Finney v. Mabry, 534 F. Supp.
1026, 1045 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Finney v. Mabry, 546 F. Supp. 628, 637 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
32. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 311
(2d Ed. 2008) (concluding that court decrees mandating specific prison policies are not effective because they
are likely to be opposed by prison staff).
33. See M. HARRIS AND D. SPILLER, AFTER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL DECREES IN
CORRECTIONAL SETTINGS: A CASE STUDY OF HOLT V. SARVER, NAT'L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE 12–13 (1976) (courts,
like the one in Holt, that include the defendant in the process of formulating remedies tend to produce solutions
that are “considered correctionally sound and desirable”).
34. See id. at 13 (describing how the court in Hamilton v. Schiro appointed experts to evaluate
“corrections, medicine, architecture, and recreation” after the defendant failed to produce an adequate remedy).
35. Id.
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36

system. What order to enter, and when to enter it, was a matter committed to the
court’s discretion, at least until passage of the PLRA. The California cases
37
generally followed the pattern of the cases that preceded them.
Typically, the plaintiffs in structural injunction suits are represented by
38
organizations with a mission. The model is provided by the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund (LDF), a pioneer organization that successfully pursued the goal of
overturning school segregation laws and then requiring that the systemic
39
discrimination in dual school systems be eradicated, “root and branch.” In
California, the litigation for prison reform is led by the Prison Law Office, whose
stated objective is a narrow one: “Our assistance is generally limited to cases
40
regarding conditions of confinement.” While one might expect the Prison Law
Office to embrace sentencing reform, the sentencing system is not its primary
target. Instead, it is concerned with what happens to prisoners while they are
41
serving their sentences.
Michael Vitiello’s paper describes Plata following a path similar to that
taken in structural reform cases, as described in the two seminal writings about
42
structural injunctions by Owen Fiss and Abram Chayes. Fiss and Chayes
became the inspiration for further development by many scholars, most notably
43
Paul Gewirtz and William A. Fletcher. Among the critics, the most influential
44
has been Gerald Rosenberg. Rosenberg’s description of the “constrained” court
takes note of the difficulties courts have in imposing politically unpopular
remedies, especially when enforcement requires cooperation of reluctant
45
bureaucracies. And experience demonstrates that the difficulties are multiplied

36. See id. at 18 (describing how the mere suggestion of extreme measures such as federal receivership
can improve state compliance with federal court directives).
37. See, e.g., Coleman v. Brown, 922 F.Supp.2d 1004, 1014 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (imposing specific
requirements for prison population reduction).
38. See Stephen L. Wasby, Race Relations Litigation in an Age of Complexity 2 (1995) (describing how
civil rights organizations often act as a conduit for public opinion).
39. Id. at 9; Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
40. Prison Law Office, About Us, PRISONLAW.COM, http://www.prisonlaw.com/about.html (last visited
Feb. 21, 2015) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)..
41. Id.
42. See generally Fiss, supra note 1, at 1; Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term—Foreword:
Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV.L. REV. 4 (1982) [hereinafter Chayes, The Burger
Court].
43. See generally Paul Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three
Doctrines, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 46 (1976); William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution:
Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635 (1982).
44. See David Schultz & Stephen E. Gottlieb, Legal Functionalism and Social Change: A Reassessment
of Rosenberg’s The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, 12 J.L. & POL. 63, 65 (1996)
(detailing the importance of Rosenberg’s work to political scientists).
45. ROSENBERG, supra note 32, at 313.
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when the court must rely on the political branches for implementation of their
46
decree.
Another notable aspect of the structural injunction is that it may require state
officials to act contrary to state law, even though the state law, standing alone, is
47
constitutional. Thus, prisoners sentenced according to state law may see their
sentences reduced even though the sentences were constitutionally valid when
48
imposed. In the course of disapproving a district court order imposing increased
property taxes to help finance a school desegregation decree, the Supreme Court
relied on the existence of a less intrusive alternative: an order to “levy property
49
taxes at a rate adequate to fund the desegregation remedy.” The clear
implication is that, where necessary, the court may order the defendant to levy
taxes beyond those authorized by state law. Such an order would either require
the legislature to adopt a new tax law or require the executive to levy a tax.
The Court in a prison conditions case typically avoids rewriting sentencing
rules and leaves it up to the state officials to determine how best to reduce prison
50
population. While sentencing is individuated, reduction programs may be
51
wholesale in nature, with the details of reduction relegated to bureaucrats. In
52
California, the court orders led in 2009 to adoption of SB 18, expanding good
time credits, and changing the parole system in order to reduce prison population,
53
in response to the court’s orders.

46. Few, if any, courts willingly cite a governor or legislature for contempt when they refuse to
implement a decree. This has been the case in Brown v. Plata. For example, after remand, when the state
persisted in its resistance to prison population reduction, the court observed: “Because of the State’s resistance
to complying with that decision, and in order to avoid the necessity of contempt proceedings against the
Governor and other state officials, this Three-Judge Court has repeatedly declined to initiate such proceedings
and has even sua sponte extended the time for defendants to comply with the Population Reduction Order
issued in conformity with Brown v. Plata.” Brown v. Plata, Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Stay June 20,
2013, No. C01–1351 THE (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Three-Judge Court, July 3, 2013). The court acknowledged
that it could legitimately hold the state in contempt, but instead it would order further steps, and “[f]ailure to
take such steps or to report on such steps every two weeks shall constitute an act of contempt.” Brown v. Plata,
Opinion and Order Requiring Defendants to Implement Amended Plan, No. C01–1351 THE (E.D. Cal. & N.D.
Cal. Three-Judge Court, June 20, 2013). Nonetheless, the court’s orders have profoundly changed prison
conditions as well as leading to legislative changes described below..
47. See, e.g., Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 974–87 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (proposing
various changes to California’s criminal justice system, not because they would cure specific unconstitutional
practices, but because they could alleviate an unconstitutional, systemic level of prison overcrowding).
48. See id. at 982 (discussing a diversion program whereby “low-risk offenders” would be released from
state prisons to participate in “community correctional programs”).
49. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51 (1990).
50. See, e.g., Coleman v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1011 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (leaving it up to the
defendant how to comply with the prison reduction order).
51. See Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 974–87 (discussing system-wide reform measures that
California officials could implement to achieve lower prison populations).
52. 2009 Cal. Stat. ch. 28, § 36, at 29–30 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1228–1230); § 38, at pp. 39–40
(amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 2933).
53. SB 18 is described in Amanda Lopez, Coleman/Plata: Highlighting the Need to Establish an
Independent Corrections Commission in California, 15 BERKELEY J. OF CRIM. LAW 96, 107–108 (2010).
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Two years later the legislature adopted AB 109, which brought about so54
called realignment by shifting some prisoners to county jails. It did not do so by
directly transferring prisoners from prisons to jails, but instead diverted incoming
55
prisoners who would normally be sent to prisons to county jails. Realignment
does not directly change the length of sentences, only where such sentences are
56
to be served. According to the California Department of Corrections, no
57
prisoners have been freed from prison as a result of realignment. The court also
ordered some expansion of good-time credits and new parole processes for
elderly persons who have served at least 25 years and for non-violent second
58
offenders. These measures could result in earlier release of some prisoners. The
state will only need to consider direct prisoner releases as a population reduction
method if it fails to produce a sufficient prison population production with
59
realignment.
The reduction order may hang as a sword of Damocles above the heads of
the governor and legislature; however, rather than hanging by a horsehair it is
supported by a rope. In an early prison case, a federal district court judge ordered
the prison officials to use good time credits, parole, and furlough programs to
60
relieve overcrowding. The Fifth Circuit reversed because the order
61
“unnecessarily invade[d] the management responsibility of state officials.” It
later clarified that such a specific order might be justified if inmate population
increased “beyond the number authorized by the space requirements of the
62
decree.”
The typical structural injunction, unlike ordinary bipolar litigation, directly
63
affects non-parties. In the school desegregation cases, the structural injunctions
54. 2011 Cal. Stat. ch. 15, § 1, at 7 (defining the act as the 2011 Realignment Legislation).
55. See 2011 Cal. Stat. ch. 15, §§ 3–633 (redefining sentences for hundreds of crimes by changing the
location of imprisonment from state prisons to county jails).
56. See 2011 Cal. Stat. ch. 15, §§ 3–633 (changing the location of where terms of imprisonment are to be
served).
57. 2011 Public Safety Realignment Fact Sheet, 3, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. AND REHAB (Dec. 19, 2013),
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/realignment-fact-sheet.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
58. Brown v. Plata, Opinion Re: Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension
of December 31, 2013, Deadline, No. C01–1351 THE (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Three-Judge Court, Feb. 10,
2014, at 3).
59. Id.
60. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.Supp. 1265, 1283–85 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (finding that good time credits,
parole reform, and work release were methods by which overcrowding in Texas prison could be reduced and
that, by failing to take these measures, state authorities had failed to take adequate measures to address the
problem of overcrowding).
61. Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1148 (5th Cir. 1982).
62. Ruiz v. Estelle, 688 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 1982).
63. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282–84
(1976) (noting that traditional litigation was “bipolar,” “retrospective,” “self-contained,” “party-initiated[,] and
party-controlled,” with a direct relationship between “right and remedy”). By contrast, he said, public law
litigation was characterized by “sprawling and amorphous” party structure that is subject to change over the
course of the litigation; negotiating/mediating processes; “judge [as] the dominant figure in organizing and
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issued by the Court affected white students, teachers of every race, bus drivers,
and even whole communities whose schools may be closed or enlarged by the
64
decree; none of these groups are a party to the typical school desegregation
case. So it is not surprising that the remedies for widespread denial of adequate
medical care, including mental health care, might affect non-parties. The cap on
prison population affects prisoners who are not members of the plaintiff class.
The effect on members of the plaintiff class is not to transfer them or release
them, but to create conditions within the prisons that meet constitutional
65
standards. The relief also affects inmates in county jails, because the state relies
on realignment to effect reduction in prison population. An influx of persons
sentenced to more than a year’s imprisonment not only may lead to overcrowding
in jails, but could expose pre-trial detainees and individuals convicted of minor
misdemeanors to a tougher bunch of cellmates, depending on how realignment is
carried out.
It is reported that over a thousand prisoners in county jails—traditionally
reserved for those sentenced to less than a year—are serving terms of five to ten
66
years and that violence in jails has increased since realignment. The same article
quotes the Monterey County Sheriff, who described realignment as “a masterful
stroke by Governor Brown to shift all the state’s prison problems to county
67
jails.” It seems clear that realignment results in release of some persons who
68
would otherwise spend more time in jail. Realignment was one reason the
69
voters were urged to adopt Proposition 30 in 2012. Proposition 30, which did
guiding the case;” judge drawing on outsiders: “masters, experts, and oversight personnel;” judge as “creator
and manager of complex forms of ongoing relief that have widespread effects on persons not before the court
and require the judge’s continuing involvement in administration and implementation.” Id. at 1984.
64. See Chayes, The Burger Court, supra note 42, at 5–6 (finding that by opening the door to “public law
litigation,” the Court in Brown “committed the federal courts to an enterprise of profound social
reconstruction.”).
65. A recent text-book asks whether a judgment that results in releasing many non-class members
[implicitly leaving most class members in prison] presents an Article III problem. The authors ask whether the
class members face an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to a particular defendant. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR.,
ABBE R. GLUCK & VICTORIA F. NOURSE, STATUTES REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION: LEGISLATION AND
ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, 249, 241 (2014). Neither the Court’s opinion nor the dissent
discuss this issue.
66. Christopher Petrella & Alex Friedmann, Consequences of California’s Realignment Initiative,
PRISONLEGALNEWS.ORG (June 2014), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2014/jun/12/consequencescalifornias-realignment-initiative/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
67. Id.
68. A highly publicized example is former California Senator Rod Wright, who was sentenced to 90 days
in jail but served no time because the jails in Los Angeles are overcrowded. The sheriff’s office insisted that
Wright was being treated the same as any other convict. In effect, the judicial sentence is subject to downward
revision by the sheriff. Laurel Rosenhall, Rod Wright’s Jail Time Goes from Ninety Days to Less Than Ninety
Minutes, SACRAMENTO BEE (last updated Nov. 2, 2014), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/
capitol-alert/article3509632.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
69. CAL. BUDGET PROJECT, WHAT WOULD PROPOSITION 30 MEAN FOR CALIFORNIA? 1 (Sep. 2012),
available at http://calbudgetcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/120911_Proposition_30_BB.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
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pass, reads: “This measure gives constitutional protection to the shift of local
public safety programs from state to local control and the shift of state revenues
70
to local government to pay for those programs.” It is financed by a four-year tax
71
increase on the wealthy. The decree potentially affects society at large, as the
state addresses the population problem by either spending the taxpayers’ money
72
on building new prisons or granting early release to some prisoners. Its effects
on local governments prompted an organization representing them to file a brief
73
supporting the state’s appeal. The law also affects prison guards, who will
benefit if population reduction leads to more manageable prisons, but will be
adversely affected if the lower population leads to lower demand for their
74
services. “CCPOA’s members cannot adequately perform these duties given the
current state of overcrowding. Based on its members’ experience with the day-today realities of overcrowding and the resulting medical deficiencies in
California’s prisons, CCPOA took the extraordinary step of intervening in the
75
three-judge court remedial proceedings on the same side as the plaintiffs.”
At the same time, both separation of powers and notions of federalism have
influenced the development of the structural injunction. Judges strain to avoid
administering schools or prisons or institutions for the disabled, because those
duties lie beyond their competency, because they are traditionally left to the
executive branch, and because the power to regulate schools and state
76
confinement institutions belongs to the states. To the extent that a case might

70. DEBRA BOWEN, CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, CAL. GENERAL
ELECTION, TUESDAY NOV. 6, 2012, 80 (2012), available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2012/general/
pdf/complete-vig-v2.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
71. See id. at 83 (establishing new income tax rates for individuals earning more than $250,000).
72. Under realignment, parolees who violate the terms of their parole are to be sent to jail rather than
prison, even if they have serious criminal backgrounds. Heather Tirado Gilligan, Prison Reform’s Unintended
Consequences, CAL. HEALTH REPORT (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.healthycal.org/prison-reform’s-unintendedconsequences/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). It has been alleged that jail overcrowding leads to
early release or even failure to incarcerate parole violators. Id. The Sacramento Bee reported that realignment
had “disappointed advocates who had lofty hopes that counties would reduce California’s notoriously high rate
of inmates who commit new crimes soon after hitting the streets.” Brad Branan, The Public Eye: Rearrest Rate
Unchanged Under California Prison Realignment, SACRAMENTO Bee (last updated Oct. 7, 2014, 1:57 PM),
http://www.sacbee.com/news/investigations/the-public-eye/article2588490.html (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review). The story suggests that realignment was not accompanied by needed parole supervision or drug
rehabilitation. Id..
73. Brief for the Cal. Ass’n. of Cntys., et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Brown v. Plata, 131
S.Ct. 1910 (2011) (No. 13–198). The brief argued that public safety realignment created a “profound shift in
prisoner management in California, which should be carefully considered before requiring additional prisoner
releases,” and that “release of higher risk offenders jeopardizes public safety and burdens county resources
dedicated to successfully implementing realignment.” Id.
74. See Brief for Appellee Intervenor California Correctional Peace Officers’ Association at 3,
Schwarzenegger v. Coleman, 131 S.Ct. 1910 (2011) No. 09-1233 (arguing that prison guards are “front line”
officials administering services in California prison and suffering the impact of prison overcrowding).
75. Id. at 2.
76. See ROSENBERG, supra note 32, at 308–10 (finding that judicial power to reform state institutions is
limited by the power of state authorities).
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implicate policy questions such as increased taxes, the purposes of confinement,
construction of new facilities, assignment of personnel, and the like, courts have
77
shown great reluctance to displace the state or local policy making apparatus.
They do so only as a last resort, when the defendants effectively punt to the court
78
and abdicate their responsibility to carry out the court’s orders.
The law treats challenges to the validity of sentences and conditions of
confinement separately—except, of course, that the state may not deliberately
sentence an individual to cruel and unusual punishment or other unconstitutional
79
treatment. State court judges, when they send convicted defendants to prisons,
do not deliberately sentence them to cruel and unusual punishment or to
deprivation of life or liberty without due process of law. As Herbert Wechsler
and Jerome Michael wrote many years ago, “the criminal law . . . should serve
the end of promoting the common good; and . . . its specific capacity for serving
this end inheres in its power to prevent or control socially undesirable
80
behavior.” Most of criminal law is committed to the state government, and the
policy of how best to promote the common good is normally committed to the
legislative and executive branches of government. The federal courts become
involved when the state oversteps constitutional limits, but in remedying those
cases they must take into account the proper role of the states and the other
branches. State sentencing policy is not, without more, a proper matter for the
81
federal courts. If the prisons were not overcrowded, the state would still be
concerned with reaching the optimal balance in sentencing policy. If sentencing
policies were perfect, there might still be overcrowded prisons, with attendant
unconstitutional denial of minimally acceptable medical care and mental health
care.
Even if the prison conditions case does not lead to an order to release
prisoners, one should not discount the impact of the court’s findings on public
opinion and on public officials. Thus, a study of the Arkansas prison conditions
litigation found: “Viewed from a broad perspective, the litigation touched several
77. See HARRIS & SPILLER, JR., supra note 33, at 12 (finding that courts yield to state authorities on
matters of policy detail).
78. Id. at 13.
79. See Chayes, The Burger Court, supra note 42, at 51–52 (1982) (describing analysis of cruel and
unusual punishment within the context of prison practices litigation).
80. JEROME MICHAEL & HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION: CASES,
STATUTES, AND COMMENTARIES 10 (1940). They then pose the question, about how convicted criminals should
be treated and cite to “three major problems: (1) What methods are best adapted to the various ends of
treatment; (2) to what extent do methods which serve one end of treatment also serve or disserve other ends; (3)
if one end of treatment must be preferred over others, . . . what should be the order of preference among them?”
Id. at 11–12. Michael Vitiello’s article underscores the complex policy issues of the balance between
rehabilitation, incapacitation, and retribution; the governmental structure issues of state and local responsibility;
and the political forces influencing sentencing policy. Michael Vitiello, Reforming California Sentencing
Practice and Policy: Are We There Yet?, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV (2015) [hereinafter Vitiello, Reforming
California Sentencing].
81. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687–88 n.9 (1977).
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areas both within and outside the prison system. It caused an improvement in the
management of the prison system while simultaneously creating administrative
82
headaches.” The study quoted the Commissioner of the prison system as saying
“that the litigation awakened the public to the need for change and, by depicting
the court as a scapegoat, prison administrators were able to make necessary
83
improvements . . . that the public might not otherwise have tolerated.”
84
Arguments in favor of California’s Proposition 47, which reforms some
sentences, note that it will help relieve prison overcrowding, though they do not
85
mention Brown v. Plata.
II. THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT
The PLRA is reactive legislation, which its proponents described as
correcting abuses in the relief in suits attacking conditions of prison
86
confinement. It represents a pendulum swing from 1980, when Congress
enacted the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act and authorized the
Attorney General to sue to remedy a pattern or practice of constitutional
87
violations in prisons and other institutions. Fifteen years later, Congress was
concerned, not with abuses in prisons but with remedies that members thought
82. FISS & RENDLEMAN, supra note 2, at 748 .
83. Id..
84. DEBRA BOWEN, CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, CALIFORNIA
GENERAL ELECTION, TUESDAY NOV. 4, 2014, 36, available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/en/
pdf/complete-vigr1.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
85. See id. at 38. See also Lopez, supra note 53, at 120. Proposition 47 was approved on Nov. 4, 2014.
DEBRA BOWEN, CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE, NOV. 4, 2014, 14, available at
http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2014-general/pdf/2014-complete-sov.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review). It may lead not only to fewer people being sent to prison but also to release of some current prisoners.
86. See Kyle T. Sullivan, To Free or Not to Free: Rethinking Release Orders Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act after Brown v. Plata, 33 B.C. J. L. & SOC. JUST. 419, 431 (2013).
87. The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997a (2012). Prison
conditions litigation followed a trajectory similar to that of school desegregation litigation. See Shima
Baradaran-Robison, Kaleidoscopic Consent Decrees: School Desegregation and Prison Reform Consent
Decrees After the Prison Litigation Reform Act and Freeman-Dowell, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1333, 1334–35
(2003). Initially, the private plaintiffs and the federal courts litigated these cases without federal executive or
legislative intervention. See Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and
Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 558–59 n.24 (2006). Then some federal courts discovered the
“litigating amicus” end run around congressional silence, and they anointed a willing Attorney General with
that title. The experience of the Attorney General in litigating these cases revealed the need for legislation, and
Congress responded with Titles IV, VI, and IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [relating largely to schools] and
the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, authorizing federal agencies to combat, through the 1964 Act,
school segregation and, through CRIPA, unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Van Swearingen,
Imprisoning Rights: The Failure of Negotiated Governance in the Prison Inmate Grevance Process, 96 CAL. L.
REV. 1353, 1356, 1358 n.27, 1367 (2008). Success of litigation under these acts led to backlash, embodied in
President Ford’s anti-busing law and in the PLRA. See Baradaran-Robison, supra note 87, at 1351; Lawrence J.
McAndrews, Missing the Bus: Gerald Ford and School Desegregation, 27 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES Q. 791, 799
(1997). Notably, however, neither act purported to deny the federal courts the ability to remedy structural
constitutional violations.
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88

went too far. “The appropriations bill in whose ‘fine print’ the PLRA was
buried was enacted by a desperate Congress after months of budgetary crisis, and
the PLRA’s sparse legislative history attests to the cursory review it received
89
amid the clangor.”
Proponents of the PLRA argued that prison population caps and release
90
orders had endangered public safety. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson pointed to
the murder of a classmate of hers by a prisoner who had been granted early
91
release from a Texas prison, under a population cap in the Ruiz case. Senator
Spencer Abraham of Michigan complained, “the result of such litigation is that
92
violent criminals are freed to prey on more victims.” Former U.S. Attorney
General William Barr testified: “Most pernicious of all, many courts were
actually capping prison populations and forcing the turning-out violent predators
back out onto the streets without any real analysis of whether this was essential to
93
alleviate an unconstitutional condition.” Testifying on the same panel as Barr,
John J. Diiulio, Jr. insisted “that while some prisons may indeed be overcrowded,
and while overcrowding may create in some conditions a need for judicial action,
the Nation’s streets are now overloaded with serious convicted criminals who are
94
out on probation and parole. This is not a myth. This is a reality.”
Even after the PLRA was adopted, the chorus continued. Senator Orrin Hatch
of Utah observed, “[t]he PLRA provides that prison population caps, which result
in revolving door justice and the commission of untold numbers of preventable
95
crimes, should be the absolute last resort.” A lawyer for the Pennsylvania prison
system testified that the prison cap had resulted in over 50,000 defendants being

88. See Sullivan, supra note 86, at 431 (describing the design of the PLRA to limit the instances in which
federal courts may grant remedies in prison conditions cases).
89. Id. at 433.
90. See id. at 437–38 (citing the requirement enacted by the PLRA that courts must give great weight to
any effects that remedies in prison cases may have on public safety).
91. Prison Reform: Enhancing the Effectiveness of Incarceration: Hearing on S. 3, S. 38, S. 400, S. 866,
S. 930, and H.R. 667 Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 9–10 (1995) (statement of Sen. Bailey
Hutchison).
92. Id. at 4–5.
93. Id. at 27. The Attorney General did not list the cases. Id. at 26–27. Elsewhere, he had bemoaned
premature release of violent offenders, without linking release to prison conditions cases: “We all know that in
many jurisdictions many violent offenders are not being sentenced to prison because of the lack of prison space.
We know that in many jurisdictions violent offenders sentenced to prison are being paroled or otherwise
released as early as possible because of space shortages.” William P. Barr, Attorney General, Remarks at the
Attorney General’s Summit on Corrections: Expanding Capacity for Serious Offenders 4 (Apr. 27, 1992),
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/04-27-1992.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
94. Prison Reform: Enhancing the Effectiveness of Incarceration: Hearing on S. 3, S. 38, S. 400, S. 866,
S. 930, and H.R. 667 Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 38 (1995) (statement of John . Diiulio
Jr.).
95. The Role of the U.S. Department of Justice in Implementing the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 2 (1996).
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96

freed from pre-trial detention. She added that these defendants committed over
10,000 crimes while free: “These included 79 murders, 959 robberies, 2,215 drug
97
dealing cases, 701 burglaries, 2,248 thefts, and 90 rapes.” Experience under
realignment, by contrast, shows no effect on the most serious offenses, but slight
increases in other offenses, 3.4% in violent crimes, and 7.6% in property crimes,
98
most notably 24,000 more stolen vehicles.
Section 802 of the PLRA is titled “Appropriate Remedies for Prison
99
Conditions.” It begins by incorporating the equitable rules that the courts had
fashioned for structural injunction cases: relief should go no further than
necessary to correct the violation of rights of individual plaintiffs, should be
narrowly drawn, and should use the least intrusive means necessary to remedy
100
the violation. The same section requires the court to “give substantial weight to
any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system
101
caused by the relief,” a theme that echoes many prior court opinions. This is
followed by yet another statement that courts would recognize as obvious: courts
shall not “order any prospective relief that requires or permits a government
official to exceed his or her authority under State or local law or otherwise
violates State or local law” unless Federal law permits the relief, the relief is
102
necessary, an no other relief is adequate.
In one of the first scholarly analyses of the PLRA Mark Tushnet and Larry
Yackle observed:
[S]ometimes, perhaps often, legislators enact statutes to make a point, or
to be able to tell their constituents that they have done something about a
problem. We call these symbolic statutes. Legislators may win politically
by enacting symbolic laws, but courts, bureaucrats, and others affected
by the statutes—here, criminals—may lose as they try to work out what
the statutes mean. Symbolic statutes are real laws, posing real problems
103
of interpretation and administration.

96. Id. at 48 (statement of Sarah Vandenbraak, Chief Counsel, Penn. Dept. of Corr.).
97. Id. at 45. The Supreme Court took note of Philadelphia’s experience, citing testimony of District
Attorney Lynne Abraham, but noted lack of documentation of the allegation and differences between the order
in Philadelphia and the order in Plata. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1942–43 n.11 (2011). The Philadelphia
case led to a consent decree in which the prison authorities agreed to reduce the number of prisoners in the
Philadelphia prisons from 4,300 to 3,750. Harris v. Pernsley, 654 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
98. Petrella & Friedmann, supra note 66.
99. Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 802 (1997).
100. Id. at § 3626(a)(1)(A).
101. Id.
102. Id. at § 3626(a)(1(B).
103. Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 2–3
(1997). See also Sullivan, supra note 86, at 436 (“The lack of precise meaning in the PLRA’s terms renders it
little more than a flaccid judicial test that allows prisoners’ constitutional rights to hang in the balance.”).

761

2014 / Does Prison Reform Bring Sentencing Reform?
Perhaps no provision more tellingly functions as a symbolic statute than
§3626(a)(1)(C): “Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the
courts, in exercising their remedial powers, to order the construction of prisons or
the raising of taxes, or to repeal or detract from otherwise applicable limitations
104
on the remedial powers of the courts.” This provision effectively says nothing.
For there is no other language in the act that could possibly be construed as
authorization to issue such an order. Yet, while the provision sends negative
vibrations regarding orders to construct prisons or raise taxes, it does not limit the
105
ability of courts to enter such orders. In any event, courts have not typically
entered such orders. This provision’s rhetoric and emptiness resembles Congress’
response to criticism of some school desegregation decrees. Congress placed in
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 this “limit” on federal court jurisdiction: “nothing
herein shall empower any official or court of the United States to issue any order
seeking to achieve a racial balance in any school by requiring the transportation
of pupils or students from one school to another . . . in order to achieve such
106
racial balance . . . .” Illustrative of the meaninglessness of the provision is the
phrase “pupil or student” without providing any clue as to whether the two words
107
were referring to two different types of person. The Supreme Court held that
the provision had no impact on the ability of courts to issue race-based orders
108
requiring busing to achieve a unitary school system; the courts had not sought
to issue such orders to achieve racial balance.
The provision that is most relevant to sentencing reform is §3626(a)(3), titled
“Prisoner Release Order.” The PLRA defines a prisoner release order as one that
has “the purpose or effect” of “reducing or limiting the prison population” or
109
“that it directs the release from or nonadmission of prisoners to a prison.” In
other words, “prisoner release order” refers to two distinct types of order. One
110
type of “prison release order” does not require the release of prisoners. Further
confusing the issue, transfer of prisoners from state prisons to county jails would
not fall within the definition of prison release order, because “prison” is defined
as a government facility that incarcerates or detains “juveniles or adults accused
of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of
111
criminal law,” so that jails come within the definition of prison. As far as the

104. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(C) (1997).
105. See 18 U.S.C. §3626(a)(1)(C) (West 2006) (neither granting nor denying courts the authority to
order the construction of prisons or the raising of taxes).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (1997).
107. Id.
108. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. 1, 17–18, 30 (1971).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(4) (1997).
110. Id.
111. Id. § 3626(g)(5).
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PLRA is concerned, transfer from prison to jail is a transfer from one prison to
112
another.
Section 3626(a)(3) perfectly illustrates how the PLRA buttresses the
113
structural injunction in prison cases. It provides that only a three-judge court
may enter a prison release order and grants state and local officials and units
broad authority to intervene to oppose the imposition or continuance of prison
114
release relief. Implicit in the section is the acknowledgment that a prison
release order may be entered, so long as a three judge court enters it. In addition
to these procedural changes, this section requires that the court have tried less
intrusive relief for a reasonable amount of time before considering prison
115
release. Finally, the court may enter prison release relief only if it finds by clear
and convincing evidence that “(i) crowding is the primary cause of the violation
of a Federal right; and (ii) no other relief will remedy the violation of the Federal
116
right.”
The legislative history of the PLRA is sparse, due perhaps to its inclusion as
Title VIII of a much longer bill. The PLRA originated in a bill ominously titled
117
the Violent Criminal Incarceration Act of 1995. Title III of that bill, bearing the
title Stop Turning Out Prisoners, would have provided:
In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, the court shall not
grant or approve any relief whose purpose or effect is to reduce or limit
the prison population, unless the plaintiff proves that crowding is the
primary cause of the deprivation of the Federal right and no other relief
118
will remedy that deprivation.
The Department of Justice had no objection to a provision barring population
limits that were not necessary to remedy the violation, but expressed concern
about the “primary cause” provision, noting that
It would be exposed to constitutional challenge as precluding adequate
remedy for a constitutional violation in certain circumstances. For
example, severe safety hazards or lack of basic sanitation might be the
primary cause of unconstitutional conditions in a facility, yet extreme
overcrowding might be a substitute and independent, but secondary,
cause of such conditions. Thus, this provision could foreclose any relief
that reduces or limits prison population through a civil action in such a

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. § 3626(a)(3)
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 3626(a)(3)(E).
H.R. 667, 104th Cong. (1995)
Id.
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case, even if no other form of relief would rectify the unconstitutional
119
condition of overcrowding.
120

The
Nothing in the legislative history contradicts this analysis.
Congressional Budget Office analysis of the bill observed: “While prison caps
must be the remedy of last resort, a court still retains the power to order this
remedy despite its intrusive nature and harmful consequences to the public if, but
only if, it is truly necessary to prevent an actual violation of a prisoner’s federal
121
rights.” As the Court recognized in the Arkansas prison case, a comprehensive
order may be required because of “the interdependence of the conditions
122
producing the violation.” While the bill as finally passed removes some of the
123
proposed language, it retains the basic concept. While the conference report on
the bill does not directly address the issue of prisoner relief, it explicitly
recognizes the need for medical treatment of the 80,000 prisoners in our nation’s
124
prisons who “suffer from severe mental illness. The conferees agree that the
care and treatment provided to these individuals is essential to their health and do
not intend for any of the provisions in this title to impact adversely on the
125
availability of this care and treatment.” The obvious rejoinder to the claim that
no relief other than prisoner release will remedy the violation is that if the
violation stems from overcrowding the court could simply order construction of
more prisons and could order that the state fund that construction. One might
argue that that avenue is blocked by section 3626(a)(1)(C), which provides
“[n]othing in this section shall be construed to authorize the courts . . . to order
126
the construction of prisons or the raising of taxes . . . .” However, as discussed
127
earlier in this paper, that provision has no teeth. If it did have teeth, it would
mean that a court could order release from prison even if construction of new
prisons would alleviate the overcrowding.

119. 142 Cong. Rec. S2296–2300 (daily e. Mar. 19, 1996) (Statement of John Schmidt). On the other
hand, Schmidt thought another provision, read narrowly, raised no substantial constitutional problems:
“Proposed 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1) in the proposal goes further than the current statute in ensuring that any relief
ordered is narrowly tailored. However, since it permits a court to order the “relief . . . necessary to remove the
conditions that are causing the deprivation of . . . Federal rights,” this aspect of the proposal appears to be
constitutionally unobjectionable, even if it constrains both state and federal courts.” Id.
120. Id.; see also Prison Reform: Enhancing the Effectiveness of Incarceration: Hearing on S. 3, S. 38, S.
400, S. 866, S. 930, and H.R. 667 Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 9–10 (1995)
121. H.R. Rep. No.104–21, at 18 (1995).
122. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 688 (1978).
123. See generally Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1997).
124. H.R. REP. NO. 104–378, at 167 (1995).
125. Id.
126. U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(C) (1997).
127. Other provisions, not addressed here, define circumstances when preliminary injunctions are
appropriate Id. § 3626(a)(2); place time limits on structural injunctions regarding prison conditions Id.; limit the
use of consent decrees Id. 3626(c)(1); and regulate the use of special masters in prison conditions cases Id. §
3626(f); and exempt state court decisions based on state law from the limits on court power. Id. § 3626(d).
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In sum, the PLRA has three faces. It reads as a negative—a limit on judicial
power. It strongly implies a positive—that federal courts do have power to
fashion structural injunctions to remedy unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. It operates as a precatory statute—courts are to take care not to rush
128
into prisoner release orders.
III. BROWN V. PLATA
The Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s order capping prison population
at 137.5% of capacity and requiring the State of California defendants to
129
formulate and submit for court approval a compliance plan. The order was
entered only after the Court had for many years attempted to remedy
130
constitutional deficiencies in inmate medical care and mental health care. As
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court majority, “[t]his case arises from serious
constitutional violations in California’s prison system. The violations have
131
persisted for years. They remain uncorrected.” The two dissenting opinions, by
Justices Scalia [joined by Justice Thomas] and Justice Alito [joined by Chief
Justice Roberts] disagreed both about the facts and about the construction of the
132
PLRA.
The central problem in Brown v. Plata is the application of the principle that
133
the scope of the remedy depends on the nature of the violation. As the dissents
in Plata point out, most beneficiaries of early release are not members of the
plaintiff classes—prisoners with serious mental disorders or other serious
134
medical conditions. The Court majority undertook a two-part analysis: first,
would the lower courts have authority to issue their order to reduce prison
population if there were no PLRA, and, if so, did the PLRA withdraw that
135
authority?
The majority’s conclusion on the first question follows well-established
136
principles for structural injunction cases. As with all equitable relief, the
128. Cf. William F. Eskridge, Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights
Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613 (1991).
129. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1922,
132. Id. at 1950–51 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. at 1959 (Alito, J., dissenting).
133. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). The Arkansas prison decision
relied in part on Swann, noting that “[o]nce invoked, ‘the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy
past wrongs is broad, . . . .’” Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 287–88 n.9 (1978) (quoting Swann at 15).
134. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1958, 1963.
135. Id. at 1923. In an earlier phase of the case, the trial court observed, “[t]he Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), which governs this case, codifies the Court’s authority to issue
prospective relief that fully remedies constitutional violations, while mandating that the relief not be overly
broad.” Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01–1351 THE, 2005 WL 2932253, at *25 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005) (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
136. See Fiss, supra, note 1, at 3.
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injunction may issue only if the court finds that the plaintiffs are suffering
137
irreparable injury and that there is no adequate remedy at law. It is
commonplace that systemic violations will generally require systemic relief, and
that this relief will affect parties and non-parties alike. Generally, the court will
begin with an order requiring the defendants to remedy the violation, leaving
138
them to devise suitable remedial mechanisms. If the defendants fail to adopt
effective remedial steps, the noose often tightens, with appointment of special
139
masters or even receivers. The Plata Court noted that the order to reduce prison
populations came after twenty-one years of litigation and twelve years of
remedial efforts over the rights of mentally ill prisoners and ten years of litigation
and five years of remedial efforts over the rights of those with other serious
140
medical conditions.
Thus, although cases challenging conditions of
confinement may lead to a sort of indirect sentencing reform in the guise of an
order to reduce prison populations, plaintiffs’ lawyers should not think that that
relief will come quickly. It is pretty much a last resort. And, as the Court pointed
out, the order did not require release of prisoners: it required the defendants to
“formulate a plan for compliance and submit its plan [for reduction of
141
population] for approval by the court.”
The dispute between the majority and the dissents also follows a familiar
pattern, exemplified not only in scholarly discussions of the role of the federal
courts but also in earlier Supreme Court decisions. One view holds that all courts
142
exist to resolve disputes between parties, a plaintiff and a defendant. They
resolve disputes by applying well settled rules, and relief is generally confined to
damages or a narrow injunction defined with specificity. Anything beyond this
143
unduly stretches the court beyond the legitimate exercise of power. Justice
Rehnquist, for example, dissenting in the Arkansas prison cases, argued that an
order limiting solitary confinement to 30 days “does nothing to remedy the plight
144
of past victims of conditions which may well have been unconstitutional.”
Instead, it “grants future offenders . . . greater benefits than the Constitution
145
requires.” The other view, of which Owen Fiss is the primary proponent, is that
courts must give content to public values, must act proactively, and will need to

137. See Plata 131 S. Ct. at 1922, 1937.
138. HARRIS & SPILLER, JR., supra note 33, at 12.
139. See id. at 18.
140. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1926.
141. Id. at 1928.
142. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 398 (1978)
143. Id.
144. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 712 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 712. The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, responds that the limit on isolation is
based on looking at the conditions in isolation cells as a whole, and that “taking the long and unhappy history of
the litigation into account, the court was justified in entering a comprehensive order to insure against the risk of
inadequate compliance.” Id., at 678.
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enter into a long, close relationship with the parties in order to ensure that the
146
defendants respect the public values that govern the case.
Justice Scalia’s dissent attempts a broadside attack on the structural
injunction, arguing that this kind of relief is beyond judicial competence and
147
leads to judges imposing policy preferences on the state. He buttresses his
objection by noting that the relief depends upon empirical predictions, which he
148
says are “necessarily based in large part upon policy views.” The crux of his
critique is: “[S]tructural injunctions depart from [the] historical practice, turning
judges into long-term administrators of complex social institutions such as
149
schools, prisons, and police departments.” Ironically, Justice Scalia is here
engaging in the very practice he criticizes: reaching his legal conclusion based
150
upon his policy views. Those views conflict with the PLRA, which, while
placing limits on the judicial imposition of structural injunctions, explicitly
exempts from those limits relief that “is necessary to correct the violation of a
151
Federal right” so long as the relief “is the least intrusive means necessary to
152
correct the violation of the Federal right.” Indeed, the PLRA also explicitly
153
allows the court to order release of prisoners as a last resort, and authorizes the
court to appoint a special master if “the remedial phase will be sufficiently
154
complex to warrant the appointment.” Justice Scalia’s emphasis on remedying
individual rather than structural violations seems to lead to the remarkable
conclusion that if the only remedy for denial of constitutionally required medical
treatment were an order to release a prisoner, the court should order that person
155
released, no matter how dangerous the prisoner may be. Nonetheless, he
concludes his dissent by saying, “[t]he PLRA is therefore best understood as an
attempt to constrain the discretion of courts issuing structural injunctions—not as
156
a mandate for their use.” Underlying his opinion is his acknowledged
disagreement with the Court’s “evolving standards of decency” jurisprudence,
upon which recognition of a prisoner’s right to minimally adequate medical
157
treatment is based.

146. Fiss, supra, note 1, at 30..
147. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1951 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 1954.
149. Id. at 1952.
150. See id. at 1951–59.
151. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1997).
152. Id. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
153. Id. § 3626(a)(3).
154. Id. § 3626(f)(1)(B).
155. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1958 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting); ”Thus, if the court
determines that a particular prisoner is being denied constitutionally required medical treatment, and the release
of that prisoner (and no other remedy) would enable him to obtain medical treatment, then the court can order
his release . . . .” Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1951.
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The other dissenters, by contrast, disagree with the district court’s factfinding process and with its findings that emerged from that process, and they
argue that, under the PLRA, the facts do not support the order to reduce the
158
prison population. In addition, they argue that the lower court should have
allowed the state to offer evidence to show that the prisons no longer were
violating constitutional rights to minimally adequate medical care, including
159
treatment of mental illness. The majority responded that the issue before the
lower court was the adequacy of the remedy for the violations the court had
160
found, and that the court did take evidence on that issue; in any event, the
evidence on remedy reflected a continuing violation.
IV. THE COURT CORRECTLY RULED IN PLATA

161

Tushnet and Yackle correctly predicted the Court’s approach to interpreting
the PLRA. “In the main, however, courts will reconcile symbolic laws with the
prevailing order . . . [C]ourts are likely to read . . . the PLRA to make only
modest adjustments to the policies the judiciary had already adopted. The effect
is that the new laws will have no systematic first-order effects . . . The statutes’
redundancy in practice may keep the issues that their sponsors purported to
162
address alive and available for further political exploitation.”
The PLRA should be construed with three basic points in mind: (1) the scant
legislative history of the act suggests that limits on the courts’ authority should
be narrowly construed; (2) separation of powers requires that the statute be
construed in a manner consistent with the judiciary’s traditional equitable and
constitutional powers as expressed in the judicial development of the law of
structural injunctions; and (3) construction of the statute should take into account
the status of prisoners in our society. Prisoners’ rights are a paradigm of
unpopular rights that the elected branches are unlikely to protect. Courts are the
main protector of prisoners. While not mentioned in the Carolene Products note
163
four, prisoners constitute a discrete and insular minority, and an unpopular and
disenfranchised one.
One may compare experience under the PLRA with experience under the fair
employment law. That law protects all of us against discrimination based on race,
164
religion, sex, national origin. The Court has narrowly construed the fair
employment law’s protections, and Congress, prompted by a broad coalition of
158. Id. at 1959 (Alito, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 1959–60.
160. Plata 131 S. Court at 1935–36.
161. See also Lauren Salins & Shepard Simpson, Note, Efforts to Fix a Broken System: Brown v. Plata
and the Prison Overcrowding Epidemic, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1153, 1183 (2013).
162. Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 103, at 84–85.
163. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938).
164. 78 U.S.C. § 703(a)(1) (1965).
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165

advocacy groups, has amended the law to overturn the narrow constructions.
Contrast this with prisoner rights. No such interest group coalition will support
166
relief that is seen as “gambling with the safety of the people of California.”
Even where disclosures of cruel and unusual conditions shock the public,
meaningful legislative or executive remedial steps are unlikely. This fact is
illustrated by the course taken by the political branches after the courts in this
case revealed the scope of the intolerable conditions that prevailed in the
California prison system. It was the inability of California’s political branches to
coalesce around meaningful remedial steps that led to ever more intrusive orders
from the Court. This is the typical pattern in cases of systemic cruel and unusual
treatment in prisons. In California, the pattern was initially reinforced by the
political power of the correctional officers, although Professor Vitiello notes that
167
they have more recently supported some reforms.
Does realignment under A.B. 109 require “the release from or nonadmission
of prisoners to a prison?” Realignment simply shifts “criminals who had
committed ‘non-serious, non-violent, and non-registerable sex crimes’ from state
168
prisons to county jails.” The injunctions in Brown v. Plata do not explicitly
require the release of prisoners, although the Supreme Court majority did suggest
that the lower court might usefully order the State to “develop a system to
identify prisoners who are unlikely to reoffend or who might otherwise be
169
candidates for early release.” The dissenters seem to have assumed that the
170
effect of the district court’s order was to require release of prisoners. For
example, Justice Alito referred to “the effect of the massive prisoner discharge on
171
public safety,” while Justice Scalia impressively characterizes the order as
172
“granting the functional equivalent of 46,000 writs of habeas corpus.” The
record does not substantiate either statement, and it seems necessary to turn to
other sources to find out what the actual effect of the order has been. In any
event, the “purpose or effect” language in the definition refers to the purpose or
effect of limiting prison population; it does not apply to the second phrase,
173
“directs the release from or nonadmission of prisoners to a prison.” In his
unsuccessful request to the Supreme Court to revisit the case in 2013, Governor
Brown argued that realignment had taken the less dangerous prisoners from the

165. See George Rutherglen, Title VII as Precedent: Past and Prologue for Future Legislation, 10 STAN.
J. C.R. & C.L. 159, 160, 184 (2014)
166. Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1967 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting).
167. Vitiello, Reforming California Sentencing, supra note 80.
168. Coleman v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1014–15 (2013).
169. Plata, 131 S.Ct. at 1947.
170. Id. at 1956, 1967 (Scalia, J., & Alito, J. dissenting).
171. Id. at 1967 (Alito, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 1956 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173. 8 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(4) (1997).
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prison population and that the lower court’s order would require early release of
174
dangerous prisoners.
Realignment now is the law of California, so it is arguable that whatever
“releases” stem from realignment result from state law, not from the federal court
order. Realignment does not release persons from state prison, but it sends to jails
convicts who otherwise would have been sent to prison, including parole
175
violators.
Ordinary equitable doctrine supports the court’s exercise of its jurisdiction to
issue a structural injunction in order to remedy a constitutional violation. To the
extent that the PLRA is meant to interfere with the exercise of that discretion,
three related principles require narrow construction. Courts should seek to find
the statutory meaning that avoids the necessity to decide whether the statute is
176
constitutional. Jurisdiction stripping legislation raises issues of separation of
177
powers and may be unconstitutional. Finally, Congress may not restrict
178
jurisdiction in a manner that denies the underlying constitutional right.
Moreover, Congress has generally taken care not to displace jurisdiction of courts
to remedy constitutional rights. Thus, Congress has rejected proposals to restrict
jurisdiction to protect separation of church and state, the right to an abortion,
179
busing as a desegregation remedy, and enforcement of the Miranda decision.
This Congressional sensitivity to the constitutional role of the courts is another
reason to assume that Congress did not intend to so trammel judicial discretion as
to deny constitutional rights. Beneath the surface lies another possible reason to
construe such statutes narrowly. The law may reflect a desire of members of
Congress, all elected, to deflect to the federal courts public criticism of federal
intervention. Judge Frank M. Johnson once referred to the tendency of elected
180
officials to “punt” difficult political issues to the courts.

174. Jurisdictional Statement (Aug. 9, 2013), Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). The trial court has
tiptoed closer to an order to release prisoners since then. See Brown v. Plata, Order Granting in Part and
Denying in Part Defendants/ Request for Extension of December 31, 2013, Deadline, No. C01–1351 THE (E.D.
Cal. & N.D. Cal. Three-Judge Court, Feb. 10, 2014), at 3, discussed supra, see note 59 and accompanying text.
175. 2011 Public Safety Realignment Fact Sheet, supra note 57, at 1, 3.
176. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001).
177. The extent of Congress’ power to restrict judicial remedies remains unclear. Ex Parte McCardle, 74
U.S. 506 (1869) “is the only example of a result-oriented restriction on the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction sustained by the Supreme Court.” JONATHAN D. VARAT, VIKRAM D. AMAR, & WILLIAM COHEN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 41 (14th ed. 2013). The authors discuss the Helms Amendment, which would have
stripped all federal of jurisdiction to hear challenges to school prayer, a proposal to forbid all federal courts
from reviewing the admission in evidence of confessions given without receiving a Miranda warning, and other
such restrictions, none of which was enacted into law. Id. at 42–43.
178. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795 (2008).
179. VARAT, AMAR, & COHEN, supra note 177, at 42; See Civil Rights 101, School Desegregation and
Equal Educational Opportunity, CIVILRIGHTS.ORG (last visited Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.civilrights.org/
resources/civilrights101/desegregation.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
180. Frank M. Johnson, The Constitution and the Federal District Judge , 54 TEX. L. REV. 903, 915
(June, 1976) (“[T]he tendency of many state officials to punt their problems with constituencies to the federal
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And, as he noted:
We would be naïve to the point of being imbecilic if we didn’t realize
that the decisions in a lot of these areas have social and political
repercussions. But I suppose that was one of the reasons, if not the main
reason, federal judges were given tenure—so they could decide cases
according to the facts and the applicable law without regard to whether it
181
was a popular or unpopular thing to do.
That kind of rhetorical exercise appears in the PLRA, which provides “[n]othing
in this section shall be construed to authorize the courts, in exercising their
remedial powers, to order the construction of prisons or the raising of taxes, or to
repeal or detract from otherwise applicable limitations on the remedial powers of
182
the courts.” There is nothing in section 3626 that could be construed in the way
183
the legislation says it shall not be construed. The provision is meaningless, but
distances the Congress from any future orders that might require new prison
construction or taxes. Notably, that provision is silent on the question of prisoner
184
release orders.
V. CONCLUSION
One cause of the unconstitutional deprivations of adequate medical care and
185
mental health care in California was prison overcrowding. The causes of prison
overcrowding can be stated simply: supply of prison capacity is lower than the
demand created by California’s criminal justice system. That demand is a
function of the incidence of crime, arrest decisions, prosecutor charging
decisions, sentencing law, the exercise of judgment by the courts, and the
operation of good time credits and parole decisions. Neither the supply side nor
the demand side of this equation is directly in issue in a case challenging the
constitutionality of prison conditions. It matters not whether demand is high or
whether supply is low. What counts is whether the prisons offer their inmates
minimally adequate conditions of confinement. But when the inadequacy of the
conditions stems in part from the imbalance between demand and supply, the
186
court may be forced to address one or both sides of the equation. Congress
courts,” quoting Wayne McCormack, The Expansion of Federal Question Jurisdiction and the Prisoner
Complaint Caseload, WIS. L. REV. 523, 536 (1975)).
181. JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR., AND THE
SOUTH’S FIGHT OVER CIVIL RIGHTS 328 (1993).
182. 18 USC § 3626(a)(1)(C) (1997).
183. Id. at § 3626.
184. Id.
185. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1927 (2011) (stating that an average of one inmate “dies every
six to seven days” because of unconstitutional prison medical care).
186. See id. at 1923 (describing how overcrowding thwarts efforts to address negative prison conditions).

771

2014 / Does Prison Reform Bring Sentencing Reform?
appears to have concluded that addressing the demand side is less problematic
than addressing the supply side, since the latter will strain state budgets and could
187
lead to higher taxes.
It is, however, inevitable that an order requiring that prison population be
kept no larger than a stated percent of prison capacity will result either in an
increase in capacity or a decrease in prison population. Capacity can be increased
either by building new prisons or by using existing facilities outside the prison
system. Realignment provides bargain basement increase in capacity. It remains
to be seen whether it is good policy. Since realignment did not reduce the prison
population to the level required by the court, further proceedings led to the state,
acting under pressure from the court, adopting new measures that could result in
release of prisoners and sentencing reform:
a ‘Compliance Officer’ who will have the authority to release prisoners
should defendants fail to reach one of the benchmarks, with the number
of prisoners released being the number necessary to bring defendants into
compliance with the missed benchmark. Further, during these two years,
defendants have agreed to develop comprehensive and sustainable prison
population-reduction reforms, including considering the establishment of
a commission to recommend reforms of state penal and sentencing
188
laws.
The defendants in Plata confronted a political problem often seen in
structural injunction cases. In order to remedy the structural violation of the
Constitution it is necessary to change an entrenched structure. Thus, after Brown
v. Board of Education required the dismantling of the apparatus of racial
segregation in the public schools, many Southern officials chose to ignore the
189
law rather than take the politically unpopular steps that Brown required. In
Alabama this led to the entry of the first statewide structural injunction, requiring
state officials to take affirmative steps to desegregate the public schools of the
190
state. The case evolved over time, with the United States, as plaintiff-

187. See Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 103, at (arguing that legislators pass “symbolic statutes” to tell the
public they are addressing a problem, but these statutes are difficult to decipher in practice); See also 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(a)(1)(C) (1997) (stating that courts do not have the power to raise taxes or to build prisons).
188. Brown v. Plata, Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants/ Request for Extension of
December 31, 2013, Deadline, No. C01–1351 THE (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Three-Judge Court, Feb. 10, 2014),
at 3. The compliance officer is to be appointed by the court and could order a stated number of prisoners to be
released, using guidelines that screen out dangerous prisoners. See id.
189. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955). See also Charles L. Zelden, From
Rights to Resources: The Southern Federal District Courts and the Transformation of Civil Rights in
Education, 1968-1974, 32 AKRON L. REV. 471 (1999) (stating that ten years after the Court’s decision in
Brown, only a few southern schools were integrated).
190. See Zelden, supra note 189, at 507 (describing how one Alabama case ordered desegregation in
almost every school in the state). See also Lee v. Macon Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 292 F. Supp. 363, 367 (M.D. Ala.
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intervener, monitoring compliance and proposing plans for desegregating
students, consolidating schools, merging athletic associations, reassigning
191
teachers, merging transportation routes. When Judge Frank M. Johnson, one of
the three judges in Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, considered later
cases involving conditions of confinement in juvenile facilities and prisons, his
192
experience in Lee influenced his remedial rulings.
Experience under Plata suggests that Fiss’s vision of the structural injunction
remains alive and that Rosenberg is wrong in suggesting that prison conditions
193
litigation is constrained where political and social support are lacking and that
courts lack implementation power. The defendants in Plata until recently fought
fiercely against the district court’s orders, but the court orders have brought
194
significant change to the California prisons. The court orders may also have
influenced public opinion regarding the need for prison reform, by appealing to
195
what Edmond Cahn called “the public sense of injustice.” One author
concludes that Brown v. Plata means: “human dignity and public safety go
196
together; one cannot flourish without the other.” Perhaps the strongest
recognition of the legitimacy and power of the structural injunction comes from
the Congress’ enactment of the PLRA. In the face of congressional unhappiness
over some of the orders in prison conditions cases, Congress carefully preserved
the core of the structural injunction in legislation that was touted as limiting the
courts.
Although weak in the context of prison conditions reform, Rosenberg’s
197
argument gains salience in the context of sentencing reform. If a prisoner’s
rights organization believes that sentences are unjust, the lack of clear
constitutional rules governing sentencing bodes ill for efforts to reform
1968) (reinforcing court’s order that schools follow “freedom-of-choice method” to continue desegregating
schools).
191. See Lee 292 F. Supp. at 366.
192. ”Time and again citizens have brought to the federal courts, and those courts reluctantly have
decided, such basic questions as how and when to make available equal quality public education to all our
children; how to guarantee all citizens an opportunity to serve on juries, to vote, and to have their votes counted
equally; under what minimal living conditions criminal offenders may be incarcerated; and what minimum
standards of care and treatment state institutions must provide the mentally ill and mentally retarded who have
been involuntarily committed to the custody of the state.” Johnson, supra note 180, at 904; See also Lee 292 F.
Supp. At 364.
193. ROSENBERG, supra note 32, 308–311. Indeed, Lee v. Macon County Board of Education shows that
political and social opposition may serve as a catalyst for federal court orders bringing about structural change.
When Governor George Wallace used the powers of his office to obstruct school desegregation, he laid the
foundation for the statewide desegregation order in Lee.
194. See Nauman, supra note 15, at 878–79 (describing the nearly 20-year court battle between California
officials and the courts in addressing significant problems in state prisons).
195. Edmond Cahn, THE WORLD OF LAW: THE LAW AS LITERATURE 574, 588 (Ephraim London ed.,
1960).
196. JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL, 9 (2014).
197. See ROSENBERG, supra note 32 at 313 (arguing that focusing on political and social change will
address poor prison conditions rather than litigation).
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198

sentencing by litigation, whether in prison conditions cases or elsewhere. As
Rosenberg puts it, “The political challenge must be faced directly,” rather than
199
through litigation. Sentencing reform simply to alleviate prison overcrowding
is likely to neglect reforming the shortcomings of the sentencing system and
200
instead put in place blunt measures. Of course, if reform through the political
process fails the organization seeking reform may have to turn to prison
conditions litigation—but that should ordinarily be a last resort.
The prisoner’s rights organization that pursues sentencing reform through
litigation to remedy unconstitutional prison conditions may also find that the
sentencing reform remedy is short-lived. The Supreme Court has ordered that
once the systemic violation of constitutional rights has ended, the court must
201
dismiss the case, absent a showing of continuing threat of violation. The trial
court in Plata has “consistently demanded a “durable” solution to California
202
prison overcrowding.” Its orders, however, may not be durable. Perhaps the
greatest contribution the court may have made would be the creation of a
sentencing commission, but at this point all we have is a commitment by the
defendants to “consider” one. If California creates a sentencing commission with
teeth, then we can say that Brown v. Plata did play an important role in
203
sentencing reform.

198. See Kathi A. Drew & R.K. Weaver, Disproportionate or Excessive Punishments: Is There a Method
for Successful Constitutional Challenges?, 2 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1995) (explaining that despite
guidelines sentences are “widely disparate” and courts have broad discretion to validate sentences imposed by a
legislature under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). See also Susanna Y. Chung, Prison
Overcrowding: Standards in Determining Eighth Amendment Violations, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2351, 2352
(2000) (stating that courts have come to different conclusions about litigation challenging prison conditions
under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
199. ROSENBERG, supra note 32, at 313.
200. See Lopez, supra note 53, at 121, 123–24 (connecting sentence reform to prison overcrowding and
detailing a holistic approach to ensure a successful sentencing commission).
201. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 491 (1992); Dowell v. Oklahoma, 396 U.S. 269, 271 (1969); see
also PLRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b), “Termination of Relief” (1997).
202. Brown v. Plata, Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants/ Request for Extension of
December 31, 2013, Deadline, No. C01–1351 THE (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Three-Judge Court, Feb. 10, 2014),
at 2.
203. See Lopez, supra note 53, at 123–24 (describing the successful elements of a sentencing
commission). See Nauman, supra note 15, at 882 (stating that Brown v. Plata opened the door for prisoner class
action suits but it remains unclear how to achieve court-mandated prison reform).
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